The transition and adaptation of students to higher education involve a wide range of challenges that justify some institutional practices promoting skills that enable students to increase their autonomy and to face the difficulties experienced. The requirements for this adaptation were particularly aggravated by the containment and sanitary conditions associated with coronavirus disease 2019. With the aim of promoting academic success and preventing dropout in the first year, a support program was implemented for students enrolled in two courses in the (...) area of education at a public university in northern Portugal during the first semester of 2020/2021. Three sessions of 50/60 min were implemented, namely, the first session focused on the verbalization of the demands, challenges, and difficulties of the transition, and the second and third sessions focused on the difficulties of academic adaptation and academic performance. Data from a dropout risk screening instrument and from the activities performed during sessions were analyzed. The main results point to student satisfaction with the content and the activities of the sessions and their usefulness. Students report not only high satisfaction levels with HE attendance, but also some emotional exhaustion due to academic activities. The continuity of the program is recommended with some improvements in its planning to ensure a more definitive version of the program in the next two years. (shrink)

Resenha de: AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Il regno e il giardino. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2019, 123 pp.

RESUMO Um retorno ao ser aparece na contemporaneidade como uma via teórica importante para se pensar as possibilidades de uma política e de uma ética livres das conformações legadas pela história do Ocidente. É nesse sentido que Giorgio Agamben desenvolve em "O uso dos corpos" o que chamará de uma arqueologia da ontologia, buscando verificar se o acesso a uma ontologia ainda é possível nos dias de hoje. Partindo de Aristóteles, passando pela escolástica, até chegar a Heidegger, Agamben evidencia como (...) a divisão binária do ser - em duas experiências contrapostas e ao mesmo tempo dependentes - mantém-se como uma aporia no pensamento e na práxis ocidental. A ontologia, como lugar originário da articulação histórica entre linguagem e mundo, é então percorrida por suas fraturas, levando o filósofo a propor uma nova leitura do ser a partir do que entende como ontologia modal. A partir dessas ideias, busca-se investigar como essa articulação medial entre essência e existência, ser e ente, comum e singular - constituída sempre em devir - propiciaria uma nova perspectiva do ser, na qual ontologia e ética se confundem. ABSTRACT A return to the being emerges in the contemporaneity as an important theoretical way to think about the possibilities of a politics and an ethics free from the legacy bequeathed by the Western history. In this sense, Giorgio Agamben develops, in the book "The use of the bodies", what he calls an archaeology of ontology, seeking to verify if the access to an ontology is still possible nowadays. Starting from Aristotle, passing by the Scholastics, until arriving at Heidegger, Agamben highlights how the binary division of being - in two opposed and, at same time, dependent experiences - remains an aporia in Western thought and praxis. The ontology, as the origin of the historical articulation between language and world, is then traversed by its fractures, leading the philosopher to propose a new reading of the being from what he understands as modal ontology. From these ideas, we intend to investigate how this medial articulation between essence and existence, being and entity, common and singular -always founded in a becoming - would provide a new perspective of the being in which ontology and ethics end up mixed. (shrink)

Analisando a comunicação memética a partir dos pontos de vista da semiologia saussuriana e do dispositivo biopolítico tal como pensado por Foucault e Agamben, bem como estabelecendo conexões entre essas teorias e o uso desse tipo de comunicação na política brasileira contemporânea, foi possível perceber neste artigo que os memes, em especial os memes políticos, em vez de operarem por meio da subjetivação, operam como dispositivos dessubjetivantes.

The aim of this article is to present the perspective of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) on death, as well as to explore the concept of "Dasein" in his work Being and Time (1927). Heidegger introduces Dasein as a being that projects itself toward the future, with death being one of those futures. He asks: "What would death be? Does it have a merely biological or an ontological-existential character?" (HEIDEGGER, 2005, p. 16). The article unfolds as follows: a brief (...) explanation of the search for being and what it represents as Dasein, or "being-there," understood as a being in time and as presence. Furthermore, it addresses the existential analytic, highlighting Dasein's inauthentic existence, the anguish characteristic of this being, and the quest for authentic existence. It also discusses how Dasein relates to others, to the world, and especially to death, analyzing the different ways Heidegger conceptualizes death in Being and Time. (shrink)

Thèse d'histoire, ce livre traite des itinéraires humains dans le réseau ferré qui, au début du XXe siècle, se répand et s'avance de l'Ouest de l'Etat de São Paulo vers celui du Mato Grosso, la Bolivie et le Paraguay, dans un projet d'intégration économique régional et de modernisation de l'intérieur du Brésil. Il existe déjà beaucoup d'études sur le chemin de fer et le rail au Brésil, mais ce livre est le seul à évoquer des expériences féminines. Des documents administratifs (...) de la com... (shrink)

According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.

Current report assessed measurement reproducibility and reliability of magnetic resonance spectroscopy (1H-MRS) at 3 Tesla in left and right posterior insular, pregenual and anterior midcingulate subdivisions. 10 healthy male volunteers aged 20 to 30 years were tested on four different days, of which 9 were included in the data analysis. Intra- and inter-subject variability of myo-Inositol (mI), Creatine (Cre), Glutamate (glu), total-Choline (tCho), total-N-acetylaspartate (tNAA) and combined Glutamine-Glutamate (Glx) were calculated considering the influence of movement parameters, age, daytime of measurements (...) and tissue composition. Overall mean intra-subject variability revealed small mean coefficients of variation (CV) across the four regions: 5.3% in aMCC, 6.6% in pgACC, 7.3% in pIL and 8.2% in pIR. For all neurochemicals combined, mean inter-subject variability demonstrated mean CVs of 9.05% (aMCC), 8.84% (pgACC), 10.00% (pIL) and 10.55% (pIR). Head movement, tissue composition and day time revealed no significant explanatory variance contribution suggesting a negligible influence on data. A strong correlation between Cramer-Rao Lower Bounds (CRLB; a measure of fitting errors) and the mean intra-subject CV (r=0.799, p<0.001) outlined the importance of low CRLB in order to obtain robust and finally meaningful 1H-MRS measures. The present findings confirm 1H-MRS as a reliable tool to measure brain neurochemistry in small subregions of the human brain. (shrink)

Esta apresentação do pensamento de Marilena Chaui procura mostrar o alcance tanto filosófico quanto acadêmico e político de sua obra, bem como sua presença no espaço público. Neste sentido, Marilena Chaui desenvolveu trabalhos de Mestre e autora, segundo uma perspectiva singular, pois, para Marilena Chaui, a Filosofia não é apenas uma profissão, mas uma vocação. Assim, também, no Departamento de Filosofia, mais do que uma carreira, Marilena realizou uma história, história que marca nossa identidade de Departamento e de Universidade. Com (...) erudição filosófica, literária e histórica, seus escritos e ensinamentos generosamente se destinam ao especialista, ao aprendiz e o grande público leitor. (shrink)

Este ensaio aborda o conceito de amizade em Kant, e procura relacioná-lo com amoral, o direito e a política kantianos. Como forma de introduzir a temática, começa otexto com uma abordagem do conceito e dos tipos de amizade apresentados por Aristóteles.Após isso, aborda o conceito e os tipos de amizade apresentados por Kant, tanto naDoutrina da Virtude (A Metafísica dos Costumes) quanto nas Preleções sobre Ética. O textotrata então dos problemas e das vantagens que o conceito kantiano de amizade representa,para, (...) por fim, procurar, sob inspiração de Aristóteles, aproximar a temática da amizadeem Kant de suas filosofias moral, jurídica e política. (shrink)

Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...) perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. (shrink)

Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than (...) to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. (shrink)

visão tradicional da fi losofi a moderna considera a distinção entre o homem e os animais como resultante da posse da razão. Isto está de acordo com uma concepção do lugar do ser humano na natureza como um lugar de destaque e superioridade em relação às outras formas de vida. Por outro lado, a gradual substituição desta postura leva a uma aproximação entre os seres vivos e a uma destituição do lugar de domínio que se julgava ser ao homem devido. (...) Tudo isso, naturalmente, vai resultar em uma crítica ao conceito tradicional de razão, como a faculdade exclusivamente humana de encontrar a verdade. Ao que parece, a fi losofi a não está em condições de, sozinha, julgar até que ponto a origem comum com os outros seres vivos é relevante para a teoria do conhecimento. Entretanto, é do maior interesse descobrir até que ponto se pode estender esta analogia entre o ser humano e os animais. Diante das similaridades reveladas pelas ciências, procurar este elemento de distinção no meio ambiente cultural parece bem mais viável do que procurar entre as capacidades cognitivas do sujeito. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

Resenha de Tible, Jean. Marx Selvagem. Quarta edição, São Paulo: Autonomia Literária, 2020.

1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...) facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them. (shrink)

Can the experience of great art play a role in our coming to understand the ethical framework of another person? In this article I draw out three themes from Iris Murdoch’s ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ in order to show the role that communal attention to works of art can play in our ethical lives. I situate this role in the context of Murdoch’s wider philosophical views.

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...) resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character. (shrink)

Este estudo parte das referências a John Dewey feitas por Daniel Dennett, para discutir como as concepções pedagógicas do primeiro se inscrevem no horizonte do naturalismo evolutivo de inspiração darwiniana. A ideia de continuidade entre natureza e experiência, presente na obra de Dewey, é um princípio teórico de amplo alcance, que se pretende aproximar, neste trabalho, com o chamado princípio de acumulação de projetos, descrito por Dennett. Sob este viés, a concepção geral de educação mantida por Dewey, a emergência das (...) instituições e valores sociais da vida compartilhada, e as habilidades de comunicação e significado, são características cuja origem remonta ao processo evolutivo, e cuja função envolve a mútua adaptação entre os indivíduos e seus ambientes. A própria educação é vista como o instrumento pelo qual os grupos sociais processam e reconstroem os componentes epistemológicos, morais, técnicos de sua vida. (shrink)

Com muito orgulho, apresentamos esta nova edição, de número 71, da Revista Educação e Filosofia. Publicada em meio a um cenário marcado pelas instabilidades, esta edição, composta por 5 artigos que abordam o tema específico do dossiê Fenomenologia e mais 11 artigos nas áreas de Educação e de Filosofia, se coloca como voz de resistência em um contexto pandêmico que alterou não apenas as estruturas da sociedade, mas sobretudo a dimensão dos nossos afetos, nossas formas de sentir e interagir com (...) o Outro e conosco mesmo enquanto seres no mundo e não apenas do mundo. Apesar dos tempos duros e sombrios, insistimos, seguimos, lutamos. Neste sentido, a temática deste dossiê é um convite à reflexão a partir de nós mesmos, nossas vivências cotidianas, relações e contradições. (shrink)

In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...) if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity. (shrink)

Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.

Dissertação: GOMES, Káthia Silva. Sob o sol de satã no interior mineiro: Fé e Liberdade em Bernanos. 2014. Dissertação – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Belo Horizonte.

A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...) favored, but her explanation of peripheral–lemniscal couplings is found to be unconvincing. Trevena and Miller's article unsuccessfully tries to rescue a dualist interactionist view. Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized. (shrink)

Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...) all cases. (shrink)

Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...) about our entitlement to use a priori concepts when thinking about the objects of empirical intuition. If the Deduction is to provide a response to Hume, Allais’s interpretation must be rejected. (shrink)

We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.

What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...) this dilemma only if it commits to our possessing a capacity for imaginative reflection, one which is capable of identifying certain formal properties of experience.This result indicates some of the commitments which must be made if transcendental arguments are to be used in the philosophy of perception, and it has implications for those views that take the philosophy of perception to be autonomous of the empirical science of perception. (shrink)

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests (...) an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and (...) formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination. (shrink)

John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.

‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...) first part of this paper I argue that this debate is best understood as concerning the question of whether our knowledge of others’ minds is based on perception or based on evidence. In the second part of the paper I suggest that our ordinary ways of thinking take our knowledge of others’ minds to be both non- evidential and non-perceptual. A satisfactory resolution to the philosophical problem of other minds thus requires us to take seriously the idea that we have a way of knowing about others’ minds which is both non-evidential and non-perceptual. I suggest that our knowledge of others’ minds which is based on their expressions – our expressive knowledge - may fit this bill. (shrink)